We consider a persuasion model in which a sender influences the actions of a receiver by selecting an experiment (public signal) from a set of feasible experiments. We ask:
Introduction
A prosecutor would like to persuade a judge to convict a defendant. She can submit to the court the testimony from one of several expert witnesses, who vary in their expertise in evaluating the available evidence. Before choosing which testimony to submit, she has private access to some information relevant to the case (e.g., she may be able to privately ask the witnesses exploratory questions, or privately observe unofficial reports from law enforcement). Can she increase the chances of a conviction by accessing such information?
That is, is an "informed" prosecutor a more successful persuader?
We investigate this question in the broader setting of a sender (she) who can affect the decisions of a receiver (he) by controlling his information environment -as in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) (KG henceforth). 1 The receiver chooses the action a that maximizes his utility u R (a, θ), where θ is an unknown state of the world. The sender wants to maximize her utility u S (a, θ), and can influence the receiver's action by providing a public signal (an experiment) whose outcome is correlated with θ. We expand on the KG model in two ways.
First, the sender in our model might be constrained in her choice of an experiment; she must choose one experiment π from a given set Π, but she can garble its outcome. 2 For instance, the prosecutor can frame the questions to the expert witness in a way that coarsens the informativeness of his testimony, or she may refrain from asking certain questions altogether.
Second, the sender in our model privately observes the realization of an exogenous signal π e before committing to an experiment π. The sender in KG commits to an experiment π prior to observing any private information. We contrast this uninformed-sender case with the case in which the sender is an expert.
Does the sender benefit from becoming an expert? That is, does she prefer to observe π e before choosing π, or does she prefer to commit to a public signal without observing π e ? The answers to these questions depend on the informational content of π e relative to experiments in Π. We say that experiment π e is redundant given Π if, for every experiment 1 See, also, Brocas and Carrillo (2007) , Rayo and Segal (2010) , Boleslavsky, Cotton, and Gurnani (2017), Alonso and Câmara (2016a,b,c) and Bergemann and Morris (2016) . 2 Note that if the set Π has a signal π F I that is fully informative of the state θ, then the sender in our model effectively has access to the same signals as in KG.
{AI, AG} and {BI, BG}. Note that π e is redundant given Π. 3 Nevertheless, the prosecutor strictly benefits from this redundant private signal. The expert prosecutor launches the investigation of the country in which she knows the defendant has an account, increasing the conviction probability to 50%.
To understand how expertise is beneficial in Example 1, note that experiments in Π differ in their informativeness, and the expert's redundant signal can pinpoint which one would ex-post reveal more information about the state. Our first result shows that if this is not the case, then a sender cannot benefit from observing redundant information. More precisely, Proposition 1 establishes that an uninformed sender is ex-ante (weakly) better off than an expert for every u S (a, θ) and u R (a, θ) if and only if π e is sequentially redundant given Π. Sequential redundancy implies that, for every possible selection rule in which the sender first observes the result of π e and then selects an experiment, there exists an available experiment π that is at least as Blackwell-informative as the sender's sequential experimentation. In other words, sequential redundancy ensures that an uninformed sender can always replicate both the expert's private signal and her ensuing choice of experiment by garbling an experiment in Π.
An important corollary of Proposition 1 is that if Π contains a fully informative experiment, then a sender can never benefit from privately observing π e , independently of the utility functions u R (a, θ) and u S (a, θ) and the informational content of π e . This result shows that the informativeness of available experiments can substitute for the sender's expertise.
In fact, a necessary condition for a sender to benefit from becoming an expert is that no experiment in Π fully reveals the state.
While sequentially redundant private information can never benefit the sender, redundant private information can strictly benefit or strictly hurt the sender. Sections 4 and 5 provide sufficient conditions for these two cases. In Section 6, we apply our results to an important economic phenomenon: the strategic use of real information in marketing (see Johnson and Myatt 2006) . We show that a retailer who can only offer a limited set of experiments to consumers strictly benefits from a salesperson that is an expert and can, consequently, select the best experiment for each consumer. Interestingly, the same expert salesperson will strictly hurt a retailer that has access to a fully informative signal. This happens because the expert salesperson destroys the company's ability to strategically garble the experiments and hide information from the consumer. Therefore, this retailer benefits from strategic ignorance: hiring non-experts and limiting the training she provides to her salesforce.
Our paper is related to the recent literature that studies the strategic design of a public signal by an informed sender. Gill the sender privately knows the realized binary state and can provide a public signal to the receiver -the cost of the signal to the sender increases in its precision. Rosar (2017) studies test design by a principal who seeks to learn the binary quality of an imperfectly informed agent, when test-taking by the agent is voluntary. Perez-Richet (2014) considers an informed sender who might be constrained in her choice of a signal. In his model, the receiver can only take two actions (validation or non-validation), and there are only two types of senders, both of whom receive the same net payoff from validation. In contrast to that paper, we consider any finite set of types for the sender and finite action space for the receiver, and we allow for general sender and receiver utility functions. Hedlund (2017) considers an informed sender who has access to any signal that is correlated with the state (so the space of signals is the same as in KG). He compares the equilibrium payoffs of a game in which the sender's type is private information and a game in which the sender's type is public information. Both Perez-Richet (2014) and Hedlund (2017) focus on characterizing the properties of equilibria, and explore how different refinements narrow the equilibrium predictions. Our focus, however, is on understanding the value of expertise in persuasion games. That is, we compare the payoff of a privately informed sender and the payoff of an uninformed sender. In particular, by looking at senders' payoffs attainable in a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we provide an upper bound on the value of expertise.
The Model
Our model features a game between a sender (she) and a receiver (he). The receiver chooses an action that affects the utility of both players. The sender can influence this choice by supplying the receiver with a public signal (experiment) that is correlated with the state.
We contrast two cases. In the first case, the sender has no private information about the state, or, equivalently, she can commit to the signal before becoming privately informed (as in KG). In the second case, the sender has private information about the state and cannot commit to the public signal before becoming informed.
Preferences and Prior Beliefs: All players are expected utility maximizers and process information according to Bayes' rule. The receiver selects an action a from a finite set A, which has at least two actions. We will relax this assumption and allow A to be a compact set for some of our results. The sender and the receiver have preferences over actions characterized by continuous von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions u S (a, θ) and u R (a, θ), with θ ∈ Θ and Θ a finite state space. Players share a common prior belief p belonging to the interior of the simplex Δ (Θ).
Private Information: An experiment π is a Z π -valued random variable that depends on the state, with a finite realization space Z π . The sender privately observes the realization of experiment π e . Let the sender's type t ∈ Δ (Θ) represent her interim belief after observing z πe (t) ∈ Z πe -i.e., Pr[θ|z πe (t)] = t θ , and β(t) the probability of t. Let T be the (finite) set of possible interim beliefs induced by π e , where, for simplicity, we assume that different realizations result in different types. Bayes' rule requires that E β [t] = t∈T β(t)t = p. The set T and the probabilities β(t) are common knowledge. Throughout the paper, we contrast two cases: T has a single element (the sender is uninformed) and T has at least two elements (the sender is privately informed).
Feasible Experiments: After observing her private signal, but before the receiver chooses his action, the sender supplies an experiment π formed from a finite set of feasible experiments Π. All experiments π in Π carry the same cost to the sender, which we assume to be zero.
When comparing the informational content of different experiments, we will consider the Blackwell information order B (Blackwell 1953 ).
We impose no special structure on the joint distribution of signal realizations of π e and experiments in Π. For instance, we could have π e ∈ Π, so that the sender could certify her type by supplying experiment π e . We also denote by π F I a fully informative experimenti.e., an experiment such that the posterior belief of a Bayesian decision maker puts non-zero probability in at most one state.
Finally, we assume that the sender can costlessly garble any experiment π and select arbitrary mixtures of experiments. A garbling of experiment π is an experiment whose realizations are independent of θ and π e conditional on the realization of experiment π. Note that by allowing for garblings implicitly allows the sender to engage in other forms of communication. For instance, changing the labels associated to realizations in Z π would mimic cheap talk communication by the sender. A mixture λ is an experiment with realization space Π ×Z, whereZ = × π∈ΠZπ , andZ π the space of realizations of a garbling of π, in which λ(π) is the probability of selecting experiment π and observing the realization of its garblingz π ∈Z π . As the sender mixes among experiments without observing their actual realizations, we assume that the choice of experiment is independent of these realizations given their type, i.e. Pr λ [(π,z)|t] = Pr (z|t) λ(π|t), π ∈ Π,z ∈Z, t ∈ T. We denote by Γ (Π) the set of all possible mixtures of garblings of experiments in Π, so that the sender supplies the receiver an experiment π ∈ Γ (Π). Following Blackwell (1953) , this implies that the sender also has access to any experiment that is less informative than any π ∈ Π. In particular, if the sender has a fully informative signal available, then she can choose any experiment that is correlated with the state (as in KG).
Timing: The sender privately learns her type t and then chooses an experiment π ∈ Γ (Π).
The receiver simultaneously observes π and its realization z π ∈ Z π , updates his beliefs, and then chooses an action a ∈ A. Payoffs are then realized.
Sender's Equilibrium Payoff:
We consider Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE). We will henceforth use the term equilibrium to refer to a PBE. After observing experiment π and realization z π , the receiver updates his information consistently, taking into account equilibrium strategies and the informational content of {π, z π }. Following Perez-Richet (2014), off the equilibrium path, if the hard information {π, z π } is inconsistent with equilibrium strategies, then the hard information has preeminence on the receiver's belief updating.
If experiment π e is uninformative, then the sender is uninformed, and we can use the results from KG to compute the sender's maximum expected equilibrium payoff V U . We refer to the informed sender's game to denote the case in which experiment π e is informative. Let w = (w(t)) t∈T , where w(t) is the expected payoff of type t, and W ⊂ R card(T ) is the set of type-dependent equilibrium payoffs of the sender. Let V I = sup w∈W t∈T β(t)w(t). That is, V I is the sender's maximum ex-ante expected utility in the informed sender game. We refer to V U as the value of persuasion by an uninformed sender and V I as the value of persuasion by an expert.
Definitions
We now introduce some properties of the information environment that allows us to compare the information that can be conveyed by an informed and an uninformed sender. For an arbitrary set of experiments Π, we say that experiment π e is redundant given Π if for every π ∈ Π, there exists π ∈ Π such that {π e , π} B π , where {π e , π} refers to the experiment in which the decision maker observes the realizations of both π e and π. In other words, π e is redundant given Π if observing the outcome of π e in addition to the outcome of some experiment π cannot generate more information than what is already available through experiments in Π. Note that redundancy is different from the notion of mutual information (see Cover and Thomas 1991) . For instance, if Π = {π F I } then we trivially have {π e , π F I } B π F I for any choice of π e and yet knowing the state does not always allow the decision maker to predict the outcome of π e .
Likewise, we say that experiment π e is strongly redundant given Π if for every π ∈ Π, {π e , π} B π. In this case, a decision maker who observes π would never change his beliefs if he then observes the realization of π e . In statistical terms, π e is strongly redundant given Π if, for each π ∈ Π, π is a sufficient statistic for {π e , π} (DeGroot 1970).
The receiver may not be able to infer the sender's type from the realization of π, even when π e is strongly redundant given π. We say that π e can be replicated with π if there exists a T −valued garbling of π, denoted by g π , such that Pr [π e = g π • π] = 1.
(1)
Therefore, if π is available, the sender can offer a garbling of π that certifies her type with probability 1.
Finally, we say that experiment π e is sequentially redundant given Π if for every z πe −contingent
Trivially, every π e that is sequentially redundant given Π must also be redundant given Π.
Non-positive Value of Expertise
How can a sender benefit from gathering some information prior to choosing an experiment?
In the absence of cost differences among experiments, an informed sender may be able to revert to an experiment that she believes more likely to induce the desired behavior in the receiver. However, such interim information will not confer an advantage to the sender if her private signal is sequentially redundant.
Proposition 1
We have that V U ≥ V I for all u S (a, θ) and u R (a, θ) if and only if π e is sequentially redundant given Γ (Π).
The proposition clarifies that the informativeness of available experiments substitutes for the sender's expertise whenever these experiments make such expertise sequentially redundant. Conversely, if π e is not sequentially redundant given Γ (Π), then an informed sender can convey more information than an uninformed sender by a judicious choice of experiment following each realization of π e . It is then easy to think of situations in which this could be beneficial to the sender. For example, suppose that sender and receiver share the same preferences, and an uninformed sender offers experiment π. Then, if the sender is privately informed, she cannot be made worse off by credibly signaling the realization of π e and offering π, so V U ≤ V I -and, in many situations, she can improve by adapting her choice of
The proof of the proposition hinges on the ability of an uninformed sender to replicate through experiments in Γ (Π) both the informed sender's private signal π e and her outcomecontingent choice of experiment. For instance, if π e is redundant, then for each experiment π ∈ Γ (Π), an uninformed sender can find an experiment that replicates the information revealed by an expert who discloses the outcomes of π and her private signal π e . Redundancy, however, does not guarantee that an uninformed sender can also replicate an expert's choice of experiment. As Example 1 in the Introduction shows, an expert with redundant private information can generate more informative experiments by conditioning her choice of a signal on her type. To guarantee that the uninformed sender can replicate both π e and the informed sender's choice, her private signal must be sequentially redundant.
The main insight of Proposition 1 is that the informativeness of the public experiments available to a sender can substitute for a sender's lack of expertise when persuading a receiver. In fact, an important implication of Proposition 1 is that a sender with access to a fully informative experiment can never benefit from becoming informed, regardless of the correlation of her private signal with experiments in Π.
Corollary 1 Suppose that A is a compact set and π
As an illustration of the corollary, consider a prosecutor persuading a judge to convict a defendant. If the prosecutor could submit any number of expert witness testimonies to the judge, and could commit to a garbling of the submitted testimonies, she could never benefit from observing some (or all) of the actual findings.
To help with applications, we next provide a characterization of sequentially redundant private signals. We will work with a minimal representation of available experiments to the sender. We say that a set of experiments
Our characterization is framed in terms of the posterior beliefs induced by realizations of different experiments. Let Q (π i ) be the set of posterior beliefs induced by experiment π i ,
, and Q ij ext = ext (conv (Q ij )) the posterior beliefs that are extreme points of the convex hull of Q ij . Note that, whenever π e is strongly redundant given Π B , any posterior induced after observing z πe and the outcome of π i must belong to Q (π i ).
(a) If π e is sequentially redundant given Γ (Π B ) , then (i) π e is strongly redundant given
A property of the extreme beliefs Q ext is that whenever q ∈ Q ext is an outcome of a The next corollary provides an easy-to-verify necessary condition for sequential redundancy.
that π e is sequentially redundant given Γ (Π B ) and for some π i , π j ∈ Π B and posteriors
The ratio Pr i [q|z πe ] / Pr i [q] represents the pointwise mutual information of the pair of outcomes z πe of π e and q of π i -how much the likelihood of q under experiment π i is revised after observing z πe . Suppose that experiments π i and π j induce different extreme beliefs q
and q . The corollary shows that the pointwise mutual information conveyed by z πe about q and q must be identical: experiment π e cannot lead to different relative occurrences of posteriors q and q . Otherwise, knowledge of z πe can be used to generate q and q at different relative frequencies.
As an application of this corollary, consider a linearly independent set Π B of partitional experiments π 1 and π 2 , and a partitional π e (as in Example 1 in the Introduction). Then, it is immediate that π e is strongly redundant given Π if and only if the partition induced by π e is coarser than the one induced by every π i , i = {1, 2}. However, for π e to be sequentially redundant, it must be that there exists at most one realization z πe such that the restriction of experiments π i to z πe are distinct.
When does Redundant Expertise Benefit the Sender?
Proposition 1 reveals that the sender cannot benefit if her expertise is sequentially redundant.
Alternatively, if her expertise is not redundant, then her choice of signal could be used to reveal her non-redundant information to the receiver. Consequently, if the receiver benefits from acquiring more information and players' preferences are sufficiently aligned, then the sender can strictly benefit from non-redundant expertise. In this section, we focus on the intermediate case: when can the sender strictly benefit from redundant, but not sequentially redundant, information?
We can exploit the concavification argument from KG to compute V U . However, computing V I can be a much harder task. To overcome this problem, we first consider a simpler game in which the signal π e is publicly observed. We then provide conditions such that the sender's payoff in this simpler game is a lower bound for V I .
Formally, consider an alternative game in which players publicly observe the realization of π e before the sender chooses experiment π. After observing realization z πe ∈ Z πe , players update their beliefs to q(z πe ). The sender then chooses the signal π * (z πe ) that maximizes her expected payoff -that is, she optimally selects a signal π * ∈ Γ (Π). Let Π * P ub ≡ {π * (z πe )} zπ e ∈Zπ e be the set of optimal signals selected by the sender in equilibrium. Let V zπ e be the sender's expected equilibrium payoff after players publicly observe z πe and the sender optimally selects π * (z πe ). The sender's ex ante expected payoff in this game is
Notice that computing V P ub is typically a much simpler task than computing V I , as it only requires repetitive use of the arguments in KG to solve for the optimal signals -we do not have to worry about the receiver's interim beliefs about the sender's private information.
Consequently, it is often simpler to verify if the sender benefits from public information
If π e is privately observed by the sender, however, then she may not achieve V P ub in equilibrium. Indeed, a strategy for the sender that selects π * (z πe (t)) may not constitute a separating equilibrium if a type t prefers the receiver's choice under π * (z πe ) when the receiver interprets signal π * (z πe ) as being offered by type t . The next proposition provides sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in which each privately informed sender chooses the same signal as the publicly informed sender, which implies that V I ≥ V P ub .
The proposition exploits a property of strongly redundant experiments: if the sender offers experiments that makes π e strongly redundant, then the receiver would not revise his beliefs if she were to observe the actual realization of π e .
Assumption (A1) (Monotone Preferences) For all a, a ∈
To simplify notation, let A ⊂ R and u S (a , θ) ≥ u S (a, θ) for a > a and θ ∈ Θ.
Proposition 3 Suppose (A1) holds.
(i) If there exists a selection of public optimal signals π * (z πe ), z πe ∈ Z πe , such that π e is strongly redundant given Π * P ub ≡ {π * (z πe )} zπ e ∈Zπ e , then V I ≥ V P ub . (ii) If π e can be replicated by each π ∈ Π, then V I ≥ V P ub . In particular, if π e and all signals in Π are partitional, with π e coarser than each π ∈ Π, then V I ≥ V P ub .
To prove the first part of the proposition, we construct a separating equilibrium in which each type t sender selects an experiment π * (z πe (t)) that would be optimal if z πe (t) were publicly observed. Strong redundancy implies that, on the equilibrium path, no sender benefits from mimicking another type's choice. In a sense, by offering experiments that make her private information strongly redundant, the sender is "letting the evidence speak for itself" -the receiver's interim belief after observing the choice of signal π * ∈ Π * P ub does not affect his posterior belief after observing the realization z π * of π * .
Assumption (A1) allows us to form inferences off-the-equilibrium-path that discipline the sender to avoid signals not used in equilibrium. When the receiver observes realization zπ of a signalπ / ∈ Π * P ub , the receiver's interim belief about the sender is such that it leads him to choose the worst action from the point of view of all senders (cf. Assumption (A1)).
Therefore, offeringπ off-the-equilibrium leads to (weakly) lower actions that ifπ were offered by type t when the realization of π e were public. Therefore, type t cannot gain from offering π / ∈ Π * P ub instead of π * (z πe (t)). The proof of part (ii) shows that if the sender's private signal can be replicated with each π ∈ Π, then there is a set of optimal signals that make her private signal strongly redundant.
For instance, for a fixed z πe , she can construct a bidimensional garbling with one dimension that is perfectly correlated with her type t while the other dimension provides the outcome of experiment π * (z πe ). In particular, if π e and all signals in Π are partitional, with π e coarser than Π, then π e can be replicated with each π ∈ Π and we must have V I ≥ V P ub .
We can then use Proposition 3 as a sufficient condition for the sender to strictly benefit from redundant information. (A1) holds and there exists a selection of optimal experiments π * (z πe ) such that π e is strongly redundant given Π * P ub ≡ {π * (z πe )} zπ e ∈Zπ e . If the sender strictly benefits from publicly observing π e , then she strictly benefits from privately observing π e ,
Corollary 3 Suppose
For instance, in Example 1 in the Introduction, if we assume that the realization of π e is public, then it is easy to verify that V P ub > V U -the sender strictly benefits from the ability to adapt her choice of experiment to the actual realization z πe . Moreover, (A1) holds and π e and all signals in Π are partitional, with π e coarser than Π. Therefore, Proposition 3(ii) implies that V I ≥ V P ub and the sender strictly benefits from privately observing π e .
When does Redundant Expertise Hurt the Sender?
Proposition 1 shows that a sender cannot benefit from observing a sequentially redundant private signal. We now study cases in which the sender is actually hurt by this interim information-that is, situations in which V U > V I . The fact that expertise can be detrimental resonates with some applications in which information limits the ability to persuade decision makers. For instance, failure to take a polygraph often leads to a negative update on a defendant's innocence. Furthermore, in some cases, failure to submit to DNA testing in paternity lawsuits automatically assigns paternity to the non-compliant.
To obtain a sharp characterization, we restrict our attention to the following case: Assumption (A2) Π = {π} and π e can be replicated withπ.
As Π consists of a single experimentπ and π e can be replicated withπ, Assumption (A2) implies that π e is also sequentially redundant and Proposition 1 establishes that V U ≥ V I .
One important case that satisfies (A2) is the case of partitional experiments π e andπ, witĥ π corresponding to a finer partition than π e .
We allow for the possibility that the uninformed sender's game admits multiple optimal experiments, and we let Π * U be the set of such optimal experiments. When studying the set of type-dependent equilibrium payoffs, we show that one can without loss restrict attention to pooling equilibria if (A2) holds. That is, the ability to replicate one's type allows a sender to sustain any vector of equilibrium payoffs by pooling on a single experiment.
While the restriction to pooling equilibria resembles the inscrutability principle of Myerson (1983), our result is based on the statistical properties of available experiments relative to π e . Following Myerson (1983) , we could allow ex-post communication by the sender and posit that all sender types select a single experiment and then communicate the information about their type revealed in an equilibrium. In principle, this would be possible if, for instance, π e is sequentially redundant, as one could always find an experiment π ∈ Γ(Π) that replicates the same distribution over realizations as the one induced by any given equilibrium (cf. Proposition 1). However, sequential redundancy is not sufficient for the distribution over receiver's actions conditional on each sender's type to be the same as in the given equilibrium. As we show in the proof of Proposition 4, a pooling equilibrium can replicate both the sender's and receiver's equilibrium payoffs if, instead, (A2) holds.
We then show that a sender is strictly worse off when privately informed if and only if, for every optimal experiment π * U ∈ Π * U , she cannot pool in equilibrium and offer π * U . Let v * π * U (t) be the interim expected utility of a type t sender when all types pool on experiment π * U . From Section 4, recall that V zπ e (t) is the value of persuasion when sender and receiver publicly observed the realization z πe (t).
Proposition 4 Suppose that (A1) and (A2) hold. Then, V U > V I if and only if
To understand the proposition, we first compute the lowest interim expected utility for a type t in any equilibrium of the informed sender game. In the proof of the proposition, we show that, when the receiver updates in the most adverse way following the experiment's realization of an out-of-the-equilibrium deviation, the sender can always improve her payoffs from such deviation by simultaneously replicating her type. This implies that the minimum expected utility that a type t can guarantee herself in any equilibrium is V zπ e (t) .
We can now interpret (5) . Condition (5) implies that, for every optimal experiment π * U ∈ Π * U , there is some type t with V zπ e (t ) > v * π * U (t ). Therefore, pooling on π * U cannot be an equilibrium of the informed-sender game. To wit, the informed sender is hurt by her expertise if, for every optimal pooling experiment, some type would prefer to offer an experiment that both "certifies" her type and is an optimal experiment when her type is public.
Under the conditions in Proposition 4, pooling is sustained in equilibrium because possible deviations are made unprofitable by eliciting the receiver's most adverse update. The ability of the sender to certify her type, coupled with the most adverse update by the receiver, allows us to characterize the lowest individually rational payoff that each type can obtain in any equilibrium. Considering refinements of signaling games that may rule out certain inferences would certainly make pooling less likely and would widen the gap between the uninformed and the informed senders' payoffs. Situations where the sender cannot replicate her type may in turn allow the sender to sustain payoff profiles that are not attainable through pooling equilibria. We leave these investigations for future research.
Application: Persuading Consumers
We next present an application that illustrates our results. To persuade a consumer (receiver), the seller (sender) can design a public signal (test of the product or marketing campaign) that allows the consumer to learn about his true valuation of the product -see If the retailer has no private information, then the following is an optimal experiment. The retailer garbles π A and designs a test with two realizations, S = {s A , s 0 }. States Note that this retailer does not find it optimal to sell the more expensive phone C. It is more profitable to bundle type C and type A consumers. The same optimal payoff can be attained by a similar garbling of π B . Now suppose that the retailer can acquire private information. For example, the retailer Note that our application satisfies the conditions of Proposition 3(ii) and Corollary 3, so that our constrained sender strictly benefits from becoming an expert. Finally, suppose that the retailer can acquire private information π E -she can hire the same expert salesperson from the previous example, who can quickly identify partitions {AH, AL}, {BH, BL} and {C}. In this case, the informed sender can no longer commit to bundle a type C with the other types. In our application, the optimal experiment of the unconstrained informed sender results in the same distribution over buyers' actions as in the previous example with a constrained informed sender -See Figure 1(b) . In both cases, the retailer's expected payoff is 7.4.
Note that our application satisfies the conditions in Proposition 4, so that our unconstrained sender strictly loses from becoming an expert.
In summary, our application captures the fact that consumers are often overwhelmed by a long menu of choices. If the retailer does not have access to a fully informative test, then she may benefit from an expert salesperson who is able to select the best experiment for each particular consumer. Hence, we can think about the case of companies strategically training their salesforce, or the firm's executives gathering information prior to designing their marketing strategies. However, if the retailer has access to a fully informative test, then she might be worse off if workers and executives have private information, as they might be unable to withhold disclosure of this information to the consumers.
Conclusion
When is an expert a more effective persuader? If a sender has access to a set of certifiable public signals (experiments), observing a private signal prior to choosing an experiment may allow her to revert to an experiment that elicits a more desired behavior in a receiver. However, we show that the informativeness of public experiments substitutes for the sender's expertise: an uninformed sender can always achieve the payoffs of an expert if she has access to experiments that are sufficiently informative. Our key condition (sequential redundancy)
ensures that an uninformed sender can always replicate both the expert's private signal and her ensuing choice of experiment. Perhaps surprisingly, redundant private information may still be valuable to the sender when it allows her to choose between experiments that carry different information.
An important implication of our analysis is that a sender can never benefit from becoming an expert when a fully informative public experiment is available. We then show that expertise may be detrimental to a sender if pooling on the uninformed sender's optimal experiment is not an equilibrium on the informed-sender game. In these situations, the sender could benefit from strategic ignorance -taking steps to guarantee to the receiver that she did not acquire private information. For instance, the prosecutor might prefer not to meet a particular witness, so that the judge knows that she did not ask the witness exploratory questions before the trial. Similarly, a retailer with access to a fully informative experiment might prefer to hire uninformed salespeople, while a constrained retailer might prefer to hire expert salespeople.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Sufficiency: We prove sufficiency without requiring A to be finite. Furthermore, we will show that every joint distribution over payoffs and the state achieved in equilibrium by an informed sender can be replicated by an uninformed sender.
This trivially implies that V U ≥ V I .
Consider an equilibrium of the informed sender game in which the sender selects an experiment according to the mixing σ(π|t) with support Π t ⊂ Γ (Π) , and denote by π σ the corresponding sequential experiment induced in equilibrium, where the receiver observes first the chosen experiment π and then its realization. Sequential redundancy implies that there exists a mixture {λ i } i∈I so that
Thus, there exists a garbling of i∈I λ i π i that generates the same joint distribution over posterior beliefs and the state as π σ (Blackwell 1953) .
Necessity: As in Perez-Richet (2016), let Φ(π) denote the set of distributions over A × Θ induced by decision rules based on the outcome of experiment π, and note that Φ(π) is compact and convex in [0, 1] |A|×|Θ| . Clearly, for any garblingπ of π we have Φ(π) ⊆ Φ(π).
If one considers mixtures over experiments in Π, then the set of distributions over A × Θ induced by decision rules based on arbitrary mixtures of experiments in Π coincides with Φ(Γ(Π)) = conv (∪ π∈Π Φ(π)), which is clearly convex. Finiteness of Π implies that Φ(Γ(Π))
is compact.
Suppose that π e is not sequentially redundant given Γ(Π). Then, there exists a sequential experiment π σ described by a randomized selection rule σ(.|z πe ), with support Π zπ e ⊂ Γ (Π) , so that σ(π|z πe ) is the probability of choosing experiment π ∈ Π zπ e after realization z πe , and such that for every mixture λ we have π σ B i∈I λ i π i . Therefore, there exists a joint distribution ϕ(a, θ) induced by selecting actions according to the outcome of π σ such when making decisions based on mixtures of experiments in Π. Consider, then, a senderreceiver game in which u R (a, θ) = u S (a, θ) = u(a, θ). A type t sender can select after each z πe (t) a mixture σ(π|z πe (t)) that has the same distribution over states and outcomes as π σ (by relabeling, if necessary, the outcomes of π σ ). This constitutes a separating equilibrium of this persuasion game in which the sender credibly signals her type and thus V I > V U .
Proof of Corollary 1:
It follows from the sufficiency proof of Proposition 1, which does not require A to be finite, and the fact that every π e is sequentially redundant given Γ(Π) if
Lemma A1: Suppose that π a B j∈I B λ a j π j and π b B j∈I B λ b j π j . Then, for α ∈ [0, 1], we have απ a + (1 − α)π b B j∈I B αλ a j + (1 − α)λ b j π j . Proof of Lemma A1: Let M k j be a Markov matrix representing the garbling of experiment π j such that, for k ∈ {a, b}, the mixture j∈I B λ k j π j followed by the garbling M k j of π j , j ∈ I B , has the same distribution over outcomes as π k . Now consider the garbling of the mixture j∈I B αλ a j + (1 − α)λ b j π j where, for any j such that αλ a j + (1 − α)λ b j > 0, the outcome of experiment π j is garbled according to the Markov matrix
It is then immediate to verify that such experiment generates the same distribution as
Proof of Proposition 2: Part (a)(i)-Sequential redundancy implies that, for each i ∈ I B , there exists a mixture λ i such that {π e , π i } B j∈I B λ i j π j . But, then, π i B j∈I B λ i j π j and linear independence implies λ i j = 0 for i = j, so that {π e , π i } B π i . As π e is strongly redundant, the set of posterior beliefs induced by jointly observing the realization of π e and
Part (a)(ii)-If Π B has a single element then (2) is trivially satisfied. 4 Suppose, then, that Π B has at least two elements. To simplify notation, let τ i and τ i (z πe ) denote the distribution over posterior beliefs, both with support on Q = ∪ i∈I B Q (π i ) , induced by experiment π i and by experiment π i conditional on observing realization z πe −so τ i (q) = Pr i (q) and τ i (z πe )(q) = Pr i (q|z πe ). Define
The proposition then states that there is α ij (z πe ) ≥ 0 so that
for every q ∈ Q ij ext . Multiplying both sides of (7) by p(z πe ) and adding over z πe ∈ Z πe implies that zπ e ∈Zπ e Pr(z πe )α ij (z πe ) = 1.
We now prove (7) . Consider the experimentπ ij,zπ e constructed as follows: if z πe is realized then it selects experiment π i , otherwise it selects experiment π j , j = i. Denote byτ ij,zπ e the induced distribution on Q. Sequential redundancy implies that there are weights μ k ij,zπ e ≥ 0 with k∈I B μ k ij,zπ e = 1 andπ
Let R = card(Z πe ) be the number of outcomes of experiment π e . Then we have Linear independence of Π B then implies zπ e ∈Zπ e k =i,j μ k ij,zπ e = 0.
As μ k ij,zπ e ≥ 0, we must then have μ k ij,zπ e = 0 for each k = i, j and z πe ∈ Z πe . Therefore, the experimentπ ij,zπ e can only be represented through a garbling of mixtures involving only experiments π i and π j .
Consider now a belief q ∈ Q ij ext . The probability of posterior q under experimentπ ij,zπ e is
As q is an extreme point of Q ij = Q (π i ) ∪ Q (π j ), it can only be induced by the same belief induced after realizations of π i and π j . Sequential redundancy impliesπ ij,zπ e B α ij (z πe )π i + (1 − α ij (z πe ))π j for some α ij (z πe ) so that, for all q ∈ Q ij ext ,
which implies (7) . 
Define
Note that {κ i } i∈I B satisfies κ i ≥ 0, i∈I B κ i = 1 andτ = i∈I B κ i τ i . Therefore, for each sequential experimentπ, we can find a mixture {κ i } i∈I of experiments in Π B witĥ
implying that π e is sequentially redundant given Π B .
Proof of Corollary 2:
Follows immediately from (2) by setting for each q, q ∈ Q ext
Proof of Proposition 3: Part (i):
Letâ(z π , z πe ) be the receiver's equilibrium action after publicly observing z πe and the realization of π. We show that the sender's strategy π * (t) = π * (z πe (t)) and receiver's choice a(z π * (t ) ) =â(z π * (t ) , z πe (t )) after observing π * (t ) ∈ Π * P ub and its realization forms a separating equilibrium of the informed sender game. First, consider deviations off-the-equilibrium path to an experimentπ ∈ Γ (Π) withπ / ∈ Π * P ub , and suppose that the receiver's posterior action after observing zπ satisfies a(zπ) = min t ∈Tâ (zπ, z πe (t )).
That is, the receiver's update off-the-equilibrium path assigns probability 1 to a type t that leads to the lowest possible action consistent with the realization zπ ofπ. Sinceâ(zπ, z πe (t)) ≥ a(zπ), then experimentπ induces a pointwise lower action off-the-equilibrium path than if the sender's type was observed by the receiver. Since each type t has available experimentπ when π e is publicly observed, then type t cannot profit from offeringπ when privately informed.
Second, consider on-the-equilibrium path deviations so that type t offers π * (t ) instead of π * (t). The strong redundancy assumption {π e , π * (z πe )} B π * (z πe ) implies that the receiver's posterior belief after observing z π * (t ) is independent of his interim belief over T .
That is, type t cannot gain by mimicking another type t when the set of type-dependent optimal experiments makes the private signal strongly redundant. As π * (t ) is available to type t when types are public, then she cannot gain by selecting π * (t ) instead of π * (t).
Part (ii):
Let I index the experiments in Π. We now show that if π e can be replicated with π i , i ∈ I, then there exists a selection of experimentsπ zπ e , z πe ∈ Z πe , that makes π e strongly redundant given Π * P ub ≡ {π zπ e } zπ e ∈Zπ e . Fix a realization z πe and an optimal public experiment π * (z πe ). Suppose that π * (z πe ) is generated by a mixture μ ze of garblings g * i,ze , π * (z πe ) = i∈I μ i,ze g * i,ze • π i . Since π e can be replicated with π i , i ∈ I, there exists a garbling g i of π i satisfying (1). The bidimensional garblingg i,ze of π i with outcome g * i,ze • π i , g i • π i also replicates π e . Then, the bidimensional experimentπ zπ e ,
which is a garbling of the mixture μ ze , satisfies π e ,π zπ e Bπzπ e . Finally, suppose that π e and all signals in Π are partitional, with π e coarser than each π ∈ Π. Then each π ∈ Π can replicate π e and, combining parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3, we have V I ≥ V P ub .
Proof of Proposition 4:
Step 1) We show that, for any equilibrium of the informedsender game, (A2) guarantees the existence of a pooling equilibrium with the same typedependent payoffs. To see this, consider an equilibrium in which the sender selects an experiment according to the mixing σ(π|t) with support Π t ⊂ Γ (Π) and let Π = ∪ t∈T Π t .
Let {1, ..., J} index the set Π . As Π = {π} , every π j ∈ Π , j ∈ {1, ..., J}, is a garbling of the same experimentπ.
Letπ e be a garbling ofπ that replicatesπ e . Consider the multidimensional experiment π = (π 1 , ..., π J ,π e ) which is a garbling ofπ. We now construct an experiment π P from π that can be supported in a pooling equilibrium and it induces the same type-dependent payoffs as the original equilibrium. From π , experiment π P reveals z π P = (j, z π j ) with probability σ(π j |t), wheret is the type associated to the realization of zπ e .That is, π P selects an experiment in (π 1 , ..., π J ) according to the mixing in the original equilibrium where, instead of type t, it uses the outcome of the experimentπ e . First, asπ e replicates π e , we have that for each type t, Pr [zπ e = t|t] = 1. Therefore, the conditional distribution over experiments in the original equilibrium, given by σ(π|t), is the same as the conditional distribution σ(π j |t) of the pooling equilibrium given the realization ofπ e . Thus, it is a sequentially rational response for the receiver to select the same actions after observing (j, z π j ) as in the original equilibrium.
Second, since Pr [zπ e = t|t] = 1 and all experiments are garblings ofπ, we must then have that for each experiment π j , Pr z π j |t = Pr z π j |zπ e = t . Therefore, the type-dependent payoffs are the same when pooling on π P as in the original equilibrium, and any deviation from pooling can be made unprofitable by the same inference off-the-equilibrium as in the original equilibrium. Thus, pooling on π P is an equilibrium of the informed sender game.
Step 2) (Sufficiency) We prove the contrapositive. Thus, suppose that V U = V I . Then, there is an equilibrium of the informed sender game that achieves the same ex-ante expected payoff as the equilibrium if uninformed. From Step 1, we must have an equilibrium in which all types pool on some experiment π p with π p ∈ Π * U . As π p is an equilibrium, each type cannot profit from certifying her type, so max t∈T V zπ e (t) − v * πp (t) ≤ 0, thus violating (5).
Step 3) (Necessity) We first show that the minimum payoff a sender can obtain by deviating from a pooling equilibrium is weakly higher if it also replicates her type. Let a (z π , μ) be the receiver's action after observing realization z π when he assigns probability μ t to type t,
and let a(z π ) = min μ∈conv(T ) a(z π , μ). Suppose that type t deviates from a pooling equilibrium by offering experiment π which is a garbling ofπ. Consider the bidimensional experiment (π ,π e ) which is again a garbling ofπ. As (π ,π e ) allows the sender to replicate its type, then we must have a(z π ) ≤ a((z π , zπ e )),
where zπ e = t with probability 1. Therefore, the minimum payoff that a sender can obtain in any equilibrium is achieved when she "certifies" her type. This is formally equivalent to V zπ e (t) .
We prove that if (5) does not hold, so that for some π * U ∈ Π * U we have
then pooling on π * U is an equilibrium of the informed sender game and V U = V I . Suppose that, after observing any deviation from π * U to an alternative experiment π and observing its realization z π , the receiver selects the action a(z π ). Then, the maximum payoff that a type t would obtain from such deviation is V zπ e (t) . Given (8) , no type would profit from deviating, and pooling on π * U is an equilibrium.
